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Crerar and the Decision
to Garrison Hong Kong
Paul Dickson
"Always remember that events now long in the past were once in the future."
F. W. Maitland

crimonious and often virulent debate
surrounds examinations ofthe Canadian
expeditionary force dispatched to Hong Kong
in the fall of 1941. The tragic fate of the Royal
Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers
in the battle for Hong Kong and their
horrendous treatment at the hands of the
Japanese following the surrender of the
garrison has polarized opinion. Generally,
historical treatment has ranged from C.P.
Stacey's and J .L. Granatstein's considered
assessments of the contemporary difficulties
facing the political and military leaders to the
Valour and the Horror's and Carl Vincent's
accusations of negligence among Canada's
political and military leadership. 1

Despite criticisms based on the
unforgiving perspective provided by hindsight,
Harry Crerar's role in these decisions has
been subject to only limited scrutiny. A
closer examination of Crerar's background
and training reveals a carefully constructed
logic in his approach. Placing the decision
within the framework of Crerar's training and
education suggests that the three most
important elements in his evaluation were a
reasoned analysis of the contemporary
strategic situation in the Far East, his longterm objectives for the army, and the reality
of the state of the army's training.

Major-General H.D.G. "Harry" Crerar
was the Chief of the General Staff, the
government's chief military advisor and senior
army officer, when the British telegram
requesting "one or two" Canadian battalions
for Hong Kong was received. [See telegram on
page 100.] "[The] Canadian Army," advised
Crerar after several days of deliberation with
his political masters, "should definitely take
this on." The accepted historical perception
has been that his strategic counsel was made
in ignorance of the conditions of the situation
in the Far East. Questions subsequently
raised on the state of training of the two
battalions chosen for the expedition further
enhanced the belief that Crerar's actions
were hasty and ill-considered.

C

A

*****
rerar had a broad familiarity with the
political and strategic circumstances of
Britain's Far Eastern possessions. His
Permanent Force career dated from 1920 and
international affairs were prominent among
his interests. Dedicated and ambitious, he
held a number of senior staff positions on the
General Staff in the interwar period that
required a constant analysis of Canada's
political and strategic position within the
Commonwealth and the world. Similarly, the
interwar educational path that marked him
for higher command brought the specifics of
the Far Eastern strategic situation, and that
of Hong Kong in particular, under his purview.
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An attack on Hong Kong and the
implications of an Anglo-Japanese conflict
were prominent imperial defence scenarios
that served as staff exercises at both of the
institutional cornerstones of the Canadian
army's professional education system- the
British Staff College at Camberley and the
Imperial Defence College (I DC). Crerar
attended the Staff College from 1922-24. Like
his contemporaries, Vice Chief of the General
Staff Major-General Ken Stuart and Assistant
Chief of the General Staff Brigadier Maurice
Pope, Crerar examined Hong Kong as a case
study. Ironically, he did not refer to this in
his testimony to the Royal Commission or in
any subsequent recollections. 2 This was likely
due to the fact that in the early 1920s Hong
Kong's position as a strategic bastion was
altered as the British reassessed their military
relationship with the Japanese and their naval
position in the Far East. The decision in June
1921 to fortifY Singapore as the main British
naval base and the restrictions of the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 forbidding
the Pacific powers from upgrading the
defences of their naval bases in the western
Pacific relegated Hong Kong to secondary
status in the British imperial defence scheme
for the Far East, not least because the
Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the
British Cabinet recognized the garrison's
vulnerability to a landward assault. The
strategic position of the outpost was further
altered by the establishment of a "period of
relief' as an accepted strategic reality in
planning for the defence of British possessions
in the Far East. It was, in fact, a recognition
of Britain's inability in the 1920s to maintain
a two-ocean navy. 3
More influential in Crerar's assessment
of the Far Eastern situation was his
examination of Hong Kong in the context of
imperial strategy when he attended the
Imperial Defence College in 1934. A senior
staff school designed to groom candidates for
important roles in the strategic and military
planning institutions of Commonwealth
governments, the IDC was established to
correct the perceived inadequacies in strategic
vision that emerged during the First World
War. 4 A series of exercises, entitled "syndicate
wargames," were used to educate the senior

officers and civilians in the strategic dilemmas
facing Britain as well as to facilitate cooperation between the government
departments and branches of service involved
in modern war.
The third syndicate wargame, in which
all students participated, was an elaborate
exercise in which the two syndicates, over a
period of eight weeks, examined the relative
political, military and economic strengths
and potential of the Japanese and British
Empires from both perspectives. "Exercise
No.3," as it was blandly called, reflected the
1934 reality of an increasingly aggressive
Japanese policy towards China and Japan's
growing estrangement from the western
nations. The exercise created a fictional
scenario set in 1936 in which the Japanese
were forced, through domestic, political and
economic pressures created by international
censure and sanctions, to expand their
possessions in China and increase pressure
on British colonies in the Far East. This,
according to the scenario, resulted in the
steady deterioration of relations between the
British Empire and Japan. It was remarkable
how closely the exercise mirrored the actual
development of events through to 1941. 5
An examination of the defence of Hong
Kong from both an operational and strategic
perspective was undertaken by the 1934
syndicate members as a necessary element of
the larger exercise. The assessment, as
reflected in the 40-page appendix and Crerar's
personal notes, included a comprehensive
assessment of the defensive requirements of
the garrison and its ability to hold out prior to
the arrival of the British Main Fleet, the
requisite "period before relief." Hong Kong's
precarious position was fully recognized. The
report concluded that "in the final event the
security of Hong Kong rested with the British
Main Fleet." Further, it was observed that the
existing garrison of three battalions was
"inadequate to provide the required degree of
security," particularly if its air and ground
forces were left unreinforced and the British
Empire was fighting alone, to ensure that the
Main Fleet had time to relieve the garrison.
The final conclusion with regards to Hong
Kong, however, was that "the risks involved
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owing to the weakness of the defences of the
base are unjustifiable in view of the serious
issues at stake." The "issues" were defined as
the necessity of retaining Hong Kong as a
forward base of operations to exert pressure
on the Japanese and to maintain British
prestige in the area. 6 This latter point was
particularly important for it revealed the
context in which the defence of Hong Kong
would continue to be viewed up to the moment
of the Japanese attack: a naval base designed
to preserve British power, its real fate was
determined by Britain's ability to project, or
at least present the image that it could project,
that power.
While all were involved in drafting the
final reports, Crerar's notes indicate that he
was well aware of the requisite period of relief
and vulnerability of the garrison. 7 During the
exercise Crerar wrote an appreciation of the
course of a Pacific war from the point of view
of "a very Senior Staff Officer in the Japanese
Army." From this position, he examined
Japan's chances in the face of the combined
economic, industrial and financial strength
of Great Britain and the Dominions. Another
scenario examined the possibility of an
alliance between the United States and the
British Empire in a Pacific conflict. 8 Crerar
concluded that Japan would lose against
such a combination. Consequently, Japan's
only rational course was to avert a war with
this coalition. A key recommendation in the
final appreciation, one reflecting the overall
calculations of relative strength, was that
Britain must court the U.S. as an ally. "We
cannot too strongly emphasise [sic]." it read,
"the importance of persuading the United
States of America to associate themselves
with us against Japan." The analysis
recognized that an American economic
embargo would have a devastating impact on
Japan, and that the strategic security that
the U.S. Pacific Fleet would provide for Hong
Kong and Britain's other Far Eastern
possessions was a priceless asset. Cooperation in Anglo-American policy would, so
the writers believed, overwhelmingly secure
British positions against the Japanese. 9
Over the next five years, in light of
changes in the international situation and

Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, CB, DSO
From an oil painting by T.R. MacDonald, June 1944
(CWM 13151)

exchanges with the Canadian foreign policy
establishment, Crerar's assessment evolved
to include a greater emphasis on the United
States. He had fruitful, if discreet, discussions
on Canada and the Far East with a small
coterie of academic and civil servants, such
as Lester Pearson of External Affairs and
Escott Reid of the Canadian Institute for
International Affairs. These discussions
confirmed the vulnerability of Hong Kong
which underlined the importance ofthe u .S. 1 o
Prompted by Japan's expansionist
policies in the late 1930s, Crerar and the
army General Staff began serious
consideration of Canada's role in a Pacific
war. The planners ranked the maintenance
of Canada's neutrality in the event of an
American-Japanese war or her commitment
in the event of an Anglo-American-Japanese
conflict as second in defence priorities. 11
Crerar, as the Secretary to the Joint Staff
Committee (JSC) and as DMO & I was an
important architect of the priorities
established by the General Staff. Whether he
played a primary role in the final policy
formulation, which seems likely, he at least
agreed with the informed assessments that
Canada could not avoid being drawn into a
99
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T E L E G R A M
From:
To:

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

Most Secret
Cypher

LONDON, September 19, 1941

No.162
No. 162. Most Secret.
In consultation with the late General
Officer Commanding who has recently arrived in this country
[Major-General Grasett], we have been considering defences of Hong
Kong. Approved policy has been that Hong Kong should be regarded
as an outpost and held as long as possible in the event of war in
the Far East.
Existing army garrison consists of four battalions
of infantry, and although this force represents bare minimum required for depot assigned to it, we have thought hitherto that it
would not ultimately serve any useful purpose to increase garrison.
Position in the Far East has now, however, changed.
Our
defences in Malaya have been improved and there have been signs
of a certain weakening in Japanese attitude towards us and the
United States.
In these circumstances it is thought that a small
reinforcement of garrison at Hong Kong e.g. by one or two more
battalions, would be very fully justified.
It would increase
strength of garrison out of all proportion to actual numbers
involved, and it would provide a strong stimulus to garrison
and Colony; it would further have a very great moral effect in
the whole of the Far East and would reassure Chiang Kai Shek as
to reality of our intention to hold the island.
His Majesty's Government in Canada will be well aware of
difficulties we are at present experiencing in providing forces
which situation in various parts of the world demands, despite
very great assistance which is being furnished by the Dominions.
We should therefore be most grateful if the Canadian Government
would consider whether one or two Canadian battalions could be
provided from Canada for this purpose.
It is thought that in view
of their special position in the north Pacific, Canadian Government
would in any case have wish to be informed of need as we see it for
reinforcement of Hong Kong and special value of such measure, even
though on a very limited scale at the present time.
It may also be
mentioned that the United States have recently despatched a small
reinforcement to the Philippines.
It would be of the greatest help
if the Canadian Government could co-operate with us in the manner
suggested, and we much hope they will feel able to do so.
If the Canadian Government agree in principle to send one or two
battalions, we should propose to communicate with you again as to
best time for their despatch, having regard to general political
situation in the Far East.
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol3/iss1/12

4

Dickson: Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong

Pacific war in which Britain was involved,
particularly if the "Australasian" Dominions
fought. 12 Canada's role in a Pacific war
involving Britain and the Commonwealth
would be far different ifthe United States was
involved and Crerar was increasingly
concerned with American views. He sent
Lester Pearson a copy of a General Staff
Memorandum dated 23 November 1936
entitled "Memorandum on the Possible Lapse
of Article XIX (Regarding New Bases) of the
Washington Naval Limitation Treaty." In it
the strategic position of Hong Kong was
described as "leaving much to be desired" if
Britain maintained the status quo. However,
an important proviso stated, "Were there a
definite alliance between Great Britain and
the United States it is possible that this
deterrent would more than compensate for
the threat which new Japanese bases would
constitute to Hong Kong." 13
Thus developed the second crucial
element in Crerar's perception ofthe strategic
balance between the Commonwealth and
Japan: the position of the United States.
Throughout this period, Crerar was confident
that the Americans would join the British in
any hostilities with Japan, a confidence that
grew through 1941 as the United States
became more embroiled in the struggle with
Germany and Japan. The British Empire will
have unqualified U.S. support "before many
weeks go by," Crerar noted in confidential
correspondence with Price Montague in June
1941. 14 However, he was also aware of the
potential liability of such an alliance,
observing before the war that "we must also
face up to the prospect that identity in AngloAmerican policy concerning the Pacific area
might well result in an increase in
international friction. " 15 Nevertheless, he
clearly hoped that war in the Far East might
be avoided if the Democracies allied and
showed their resolve.
Although his attention was firmly fixed
on Europe after the outbreak of war in
September 1939, Crerar remained well
informed on the strategic situation in the Far
East. In the fall of 1939, he was sent to
London to establish an overseas Canadian
military headquarters of which he was

appointed Senior Officer. Initiating the
dispatch of weekly and monthly War Office
intelligence assessments and strategic
summaries
to
Canadian
Military
Headquarters (CMHQ) and National Defence
Headquarters (NDHQ) was an early, and
important, achievement. As well, through
1939-1940, he attended bi-weekly meetings
on the war situation with the British DMO,
Major-General Richard Dewing, which kept
Crerar abreast of British attitudes and
strategic estimates.

*****

C

rerar's appointment as the Chief of the
General Staff (CGS) in July 1940 provided
the second strand in Crerar's approach to the
dispatch and the context within which it was
made. He returned to Canada to organize the
army's expansion and training based on his
experiences in England. 16 As CGS, keeping
on top of strategic information was difficult
given the myriad duties which accompanied
the creation of a national army from scratch.
These difficulties were magnified by the need
to steer a cautious path through Prime
Minister Mackenzie King's fears of repeating
the conscription crisis of the First World War.
Crerar, however, proved a shrewd politician
and manuevered until he successfully gained
the government's explicit, if hesitant, support
for a Canadian Army formation of five full
divisions and an armoured brigade. He also
sought, less successfully, an expansion of
the military's position as policy advisors,
prerogatives long denied them by successive
Canadian governments. 17
The expansion of the Canadian army for
service in Europe was the vehicle to fulfil all
Crerar's aspirations but this proved an
immense task through 1940 and 1941. He
established policy for, and directed, the
expansion and re-organization ofNDHQ, and
set training policy for the units raised. The
uncertainty surrounding the Canadian army's
role also affected the pace of army expansion
through 1940 and 1941. 18 Personality
conflicts and professional differences within
NDHQ further exacerbated the tense
atmosphere
that
informed
army
reorganization. 19 Perhaps the biggest
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impediment was government resistance to
army expansion, an opposition led by the
plodding, but politically attuned, Mackenzie
King.2o
Despite his political successes, by the
summer of 1941 the inactivity of the Canadian
army had created a sour public mood, one
which the government leaders and the military
were hard-pressed to quell. The army provided
a visible target for pro-conscriptionists and
others who equated large ground forces with
a commitment to total war. 21 By late July
1941, Crerar was characterized by one
observer as "exceedingly worried" over the
"insidious campaign" of criticism. 22 Faced
with the need to maintain a steady flow of
volunteers for overseas service, he urged the
government, in addition to a governmentsponsored national recruitment campaign,
to advocate greater involvement for Canadian
troops overseas. "I feel it is in the interests of
the Corps," wrote Crerar, "if not the country
[as] there is a not unnatural desire to see
Canadians in the headlines these days." 23
Desperate to quell the pro-conscriptionists,
King reluctantly telegraphed Churchill
"reaffirming the government's willingness to
have Canadian troops serve in any theatre"
and then set out on a speaking tour of the
country. 24 Concrete action, however, was
needed to dispel the malaise that was settling
over the Canadian war effort.
An opportunity for action soon afforded
itself. In August of 1941, as he prepared for
the second round of army expansion, Crerar
met with an old Royal Military College
colleague, Canadian-born Major-General A. E.
Grasett. He was the former General Officer
Commanding (GOC). British Troops in China
passing through Ottawa on his return voyage
to the United Kingdom. Innocuous enough
that the exact time of the stay was not
recorded, the discussions that took place
between Crerar and Grasett took on a great
importance after the fact. According to Crerar,
the situation in the Far East and Hong Kong
was broached in "long discussions" between
himself, Grasett and Ralston. In the course
of the conversations, Grasett forwarded the
opinion that two additional battalions "would
render the garrison strong enough to

withstand for an extensive period of siege an
attack by such forces as the Japanese could
bring to bear against it. "25 This latter
assessment was an important confirmation
of the prevailing viewpoint, in some circles, of
the viability of defending Hong Kong in the
event of a Japanese attack.
Several years later, Crerar recalled that
"neither to myself alone, nor to the Minister
and myself jointly, did Grasett then raise the
question of obtaining these two additional
battalions from Canada. "26 The truth of this
statement has been questioned in light of
Grasett's subsequent suggestion to the British
Chiefs of Staff that Canada might provide the
necessary troops for reinforcing Hong Kong.
However, Ralston's cautious reaction to the
British request in September suggests that
the Minister, at least, was not expecting this
initiative despite the fact that he met with
Grasett in Crerar's presence. Whatever the
truth, stated government policy, reiterated
by the Minister only weeks later in
conversations with the British Secretary of
State for War, was that "the Canadian
government was fully prepared to sanction
employment of the Canadian Corps in any
military operations which the War Office might
recommend." In obvious deference to
Mackenzie King's concerns, Ralston added
that "He did not wish this statement to convey
the idea that the Canadian Government was
pressing for the active employment of
Canadian forces but ... that there would be
no restrictive tendencies on the part of the
Canadian government." In other words, not
necessarily employment but employment if
necessary. It would be surprising then if the
deployment of Canadian units in some theatre
of war had not, at least, been mentioned. 27
Indeed, in the circumstances, neither an
initiative by Crerar or Grasett was remarkable.
Grasett's suggestion to Churchill and
the Chiefs of Staff that Canada might provide
the additional troops he believed would secure
Hong Kong for the "period of relief' proved
timely. 28 Months earlier and it might have
been dismissed. However, significant shifts
in the diplomatic and military situation had
taken place in the Far East and Europe during
1941, changes perceived through the filter of
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Churchillean assessment of January 1941
that no troops should be sent to Hong Kong
given its precarious position in the event of a
Pacific war that seemed imminent. 30 Even as
Churchill proffered this opinion, however, he
was convinced that greater involvement by
the United States and her Pacific Fleet would
provide sufficient military might to deter
Japan from attacking Western possessions.

Major-General A.E. Grasett
(NAC PA 116456)

Britain's long-standing policy of deterring
Japanese aggression and informed by Britain's
determination to defend her possessions in
South-EastAsia. Of questionable practicality
even prior to the war, Britain's chances of
responding militarily to a major crisis in the
Far East had decreased dramatically after
the fall of France, the loss of the powerful
French fleet and the subsequent necessity of
maintaining a presence in the Mediterranean
on her own. Nevertheless, British political
leaders remained committed to defending the
empire in the Far East. In hopes of deterring
rather than encountering Japanese
aggression, policy centred on the cultivation
of American support, the maintenance of
Chinese independence and occasional shows
of military commitment. 29 The doubts in
early 1941 about the effectiveness of this
policy were reflected in the oft-quoted

By the summer of 1941, the British
were optimistic that the policies designed to
foster deterrence were beginning to pay
dividends. The joint American, British and
Dutch declaration of solidarity in mid-1941
was one result, one which the British hoped
would have the desired effect of giving pause
to Japan's ambitions. The main plank in the
British policy became reality when, that
summer, the Americans became the central
players in the Far Eastern drama. They
began to reinforce the Philippines, moved the
Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbour, tightened their
economic sanctions and issued explicit
warnings to Japan. The hardening of
American policy towards Japan, and
Roosevelt's enthusiastic support for
Churchill's agenda at Placentia Bay in
September, prompted reassessments of
Britain's strategic position in the Far East.3 1
Christopher Thorne's observation that "Like
Stimson [U.S. Secretary of State]. Churchill
believed that a flexing of Anglo-Saxon muscle
would keep the Japanese in their place"
reflects the sum ofBritish calculations. 32 The
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee ofthe Chiefs
of Staff (JIC) reports for August and
September, informed by self-serving racial
comparisons, only confirmed this optimistic
misconception. 33
The British government, despite
lingering concerns
over American
equivocation, responded by tightening
economic sanctions against Japan and, at
Churchill's urging, promised naval
reinforcements in the form of the battleship
H.M.S. Prince of Wales, the battle cruiser
Repulse, and the aircraft carrier Indomitable.
Ignoring doubts on the part of the First Sea
Lord Sir Dudley Pound, Churchill was
convinced ofthe effect such a squadron would
have. 34 He believed that the conditions for
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providing an effective deterrent were in place
and that Britain was required to show her
resolve to the Americans and the embattled
Chinese. Concurrently, strategic intelligence
officers, despite the bloody nose inflicted by
the Soviet Red Army on Japanese forces in
1938-39, indicated that the Japanese might
turn north rather than south to take advantage
of Russian weakness. 35 This assessment of
the success of the policy of deterrence, and
the changes wrought by Russian weakness in
the summer, was reflected in the British
telegram of 1941 requesting troops from
Canada for the garrison at Hong Kong.
Convinced that the moment should be
seized, the British government approached
the Canadian government on 19 September,
informing them of the favourable changes in
their assessment ofthe British position in the
Far East. Given these shifts, they enquired if
"one or two Canadian battalions could be
provided from Canada," implying that
Canadian troops in Britain should remain
untouched, for the imperial outpost at Hong
Kong. The telegram stressed that the "action
would strengthen [the] garrison all out of
proportion to actual numbers involved" and
"would reassure Chiang Kai Shek as to the
genuineness of our intention to hold the
colony," an important objective given that 40
of the Japanese army's 51 divisions were
committed to the Chinese theatre. 36 They did
not mention that Hong Kong's status as an
"outpost" remained the same. Rather, the
telegram implied that Hong Kong's position
was considered safer than in recent months.
Finally, they implied that there was some
urgency "having regard to the political
situation in the Far East. "37
The decision was necessarily a political
one. The domestic political implications of a
refusal to dispatch Canadian troops to aid
Britain were obvious. The arrival of the
telegram found Ralston in the United States,
thus the note fell under the purview of the
Associate Minister of National Defence,
Charles "Chubby" Power. Power, in his
testimony to the Royal Commission of Enquiry
in 1942, recalled that upon receipt of the
cable he immediately "telephoned ... General
Crerar and discussed the matter in a broad

and general way." 38 Power followed up this
call, meeting with Crerar on the next morning.
Crerar, in his discussions with Power,
noted that the dispatch of troops was
ultimately a political as well as moral decision.
Emphasizing the improved Far Eastern
situation, Crerar believed that Canada had a
moral responsibility to Britain, in the absence
of more concrete ties. This was an important
link in imperial co-operation. 39 The CGS
presented this view of the political and moral
nature of the Hong Kong decision to MajorGeneral Ken Stuart and Major-General
Maurice Pope, the Vice Chief of the General
Staff and the Deputy Chief of the General
Staff respectively. They were in full agreement
with Crerar's assessment. 40
On 23 September, Power submitted the
British request to the Cabinet War Committee
for consideration. Decision, however, was
deferred until the proposal could be
thoroughly examined by the General Staff
and Ralston. 41 Because Ralston was in Los
Angeles, a brief was prepared on the 24th for
his information and as a basis for discussion
with Crerar. Written by the DMO & I, Colonel
Richard Gibson, after talks with Crerar, the
brief gave the impression, wrongly, that the
government had already approved the decision
to dispatch in principle. Gibson related the
Cabinet War Committee's preparedness to
accept the proposal and the fact that the CGS
saw no "military risks in dispatching Cdn Bns
for this purpose. "42 The inference was
incorrect and was absent from the DMO & I's
draft memorandum revised by Crerar on the
afternoon of the 24th. 43 Ralston nevertheless
based his discussions with the CGS on the
first brief and may have been labouring under
the assumption that the War Cabinet had
accepted the proposal.
After their
conversation in the early evening of 24
September, in which Crerar reiterated his
belief that the army could accept the
responsibility, both were ready to promote
the project.
In Crerar's calculations, the military
"risks" were important considerations but he
believed the primary risk from a Canadian
perspective was the potential impediment to
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the organization of formations due for
employment in the British Isles. The attendant
military risks of sending troops to the Far
East were explained in terms of the improved
strategic situation, the strengthening of
British bases in Malaya and the effect on
Chinese moral which implied that Japanese
forces would continue to be tied up in China.
When questioned about a General Staff
appreciation of the tactical situation of the
Hong Kong garrison, Crerar observed to the
Royal Commission that:
I was not asked by the Minister or anyone
else for such a military appreciation, nor
did I consider that in the setting of the
British request that such a request would
be made. The decision for or against the
despatch . . . necessarily required to be
taken on the highest policy level. 44

Crerar clearly based his decision on the
intelligence provided by the British telegram.
According to the testimony of the DMO & I
and his senior intelligence officer, LieutenantColonel William Murray, up-to-date
information on the defences of Hong Kong
was available at NDHQ, but no formal request
was made for the information by the General
Staff until after the dispatch had been decided
upon. Neither was a military appreciation of
Hong Kong's defences in the event of a war
requested or prepared. 45 However, as the
post-war CGS observed in 1948 "[T]here is
nothing ... to show that the Department of
National Defence had a staff which could
work out the pros and cons of accepting this
proposal ... the Canadian Authorities were
completely dependent on information received
from the UK. "46 An accurate observation.
Through 1940 and 1941, despite Crerar's
reorganization ofNDHQ, no separate general
staff intelligence directorate was created.
While the number of officers handling
intelligence had increased from one in 1940
to seven in 1941 , only one of these handled
"foreign intelligence." Crerar's acceptance of
the intelligence organization at NDHQ was an
admission that it was beyond Canada's
capabilities to start an intelligence assessment
network from scratchY He was correct but it
left Canada dependent on the British for
information and, more importantly,

assessments of that information. Limited
information on the defences of Hong Kong
was available at NDHQ, but such information
was not synonymous with intelligence
appreciations of the kind that were expressed
in the British telegram.

*****

T

he third element in Crerar's approach to
the decision to dispatch troops to Hong
Kong involved his knowledge of the state of
the army's training. The government did not
formally approve the dispatch until2 October
1941 but the selection of units was already
Crerar's choices for the units
underway.
deployed to Hong Kong, the Royal Rifles of
Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, derived
from the logic that informed his advice to the
government - that war with Japan was less
likely than previously, that Europe was the
main theatre and that Hong Kong was a
garrison responsibility. 48 Crerar's 30
September memorandum to the Minister on
unit selection emphasized two general points
- that the units "should be efficient, welltrained battalions" and that the selection
should not disrupt the training of the 4th
Canadian Division, preparing for overseas
service. 49 The CGS's agenda, explicit in the
latter point, and the demands placed on an
already strained mobilization and training
system thus limited which trained units were
available. Crerar could not disrupt the
organization of forces already slated for Britain
nor did the British want these units broken
up. Others, including the General Officer
Commanding of the 4th Canadian Division
were of the same mind. 5o
'
Crerar's estimation that hostilities with
Japan were not imminent also guided his
choice. It seems apparent that he believed,
despite the assessment of Director of Military
Training, that the two units selected were in
need of "refresher" training. They were by his
definition ones of "proven efficiency" and
would suffer declines in morale if they were
kept in Canada for prolonged periods.
Similarly. he assumed that the garrison duties
of Hong Kong would not differ much from that
of the Royal Rifles' responsibilities in
Newfoundland or the Grenadiers' duties in
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Jamaica, observing that they were capable of
"upholding the credit of the Dominion" in "a
distant and important garrison." He also
believed that the men were of a high standard,
based on information obtained from the unit
commanding officers and on personal
observations on the quality of the troops.
Both battalions had proven themselves in the
roles allotted them and were among the most
experienced of the available units. 5 1
Satisfied that the units selected were
efficient and available, Crerar, for government
consumption, noted that the units fulfilled a
number of domestic requirements. In addition
to representing two distinct regions, attention
was drawn to the fact that the Royal Rifles
were from a French-speaking region. The
unstated message, found in an early draft of
the reasoning behind the selection, and one
possibly discussed with C. G. Power, was that
the Royal Rifles "should serve in a theatre
where casualties are not likely to be heavy or
sustained." The draft memorandum
concluded "Clearly it could not long retain its
character and identity in a main theatre of
war for it could not be reinforced from its own
territory. "52 Events were to prove this a tragic
prophecy.
Crerar's selection of units clearly
indicates that he believed that the risks were
minimal and that disrupting the expansion of
formations earmarked for Europe was far
more dangerous. Through the fall, he
continued to mirror British optimism
regarding Japanese intentions. Visiting
London in October 1941, he and Ralston were
informed that in the opinion of the British
Joint Planning Board, an inter-service
strategic planning committee, the "initial
Japanese military action would be directed
against Russia" and that, for offensive
purposes, the "retention of Hong Kong was
stated to be of very great importance. "53 In
the opinion of the Canadian General Staff,
based on the assessments provided by British
intelligence, war with Japan was more remote
than in any period in a number of months. 5 4
The revised Army Programme for 1942,
submitted in mid-November 1941, reflected
Crerar's focus on expanding the army for
deployment against Germany and the

optimistic assessment of the strategic
situation in the Far East. 55 Any doubts he
may have had were quelled by British
assurances that should war break out "the
U.S.A. would join us." British requests for
speed lest the opportunity was lost left little
time for further second guessing. 56

*****

C

rerar's estimation of the value of a small
show of imperial unity was informed by
calculations based on the strategic
information at his disposal. Sending two
battalions of Canadian troops, and later a
brigade headquarters, was obviously not going
to deter the Japanese from going to war but
the cumulative impact of a timely show of
Empire solidarity, in combination with
increased U.S. involvement and enhanced
British naval strength fitted into Crerar's
prewar assessment of the impact of Empire
resolve and American support. He compared
the expeditionary force dispatched to Hong
Kong with the British dispatch of troops to
Greece to explain his conception ofthe factors
behind the decision to dispatch troops to
Hong Kong. "The proposed action," Crerar
observed, "whatever the military risks of the
enterprise, needed to be examined from the
broad view as to its contributory value to the
eventual winning of the war. "57 Confident
that the military risks of an actual Japanese
attack were minimal, and convinced of the
urgency of the situation, Crerar concluded
that "the Canadian army should definitely
take this on." 58 His assessment of Japanese
intentions was no worse, and no better, than
the British or American. Nevertheless, the
U.S. belief that the Philippines could be held
exemplifies how badly Allied strategists
underestimated the Japanese. 59 The
indignant tone Crerar adopted in his testimony
to the Royal Commission and when the issue
was raised in personal correspondence
indicated that he was conscious of having
misjudged the strategic situation.
Professional considerations were also
important, if implied, factors in the evaluation,
factors that informed Crerar's perception of
the political and strategic stakes of his
decisions in the fall of 1941. In Canada,
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Soldiers of the Winnipeg Grenadiers aboard the Awatea heading for Hong Kong.
(CFPU PMR 79-1 79)

attention was firmly fixed on Europe and the
static role assigned the Canadian army. With
Dominion troops in North Africa and Britain's
resources stretched beyond the breaking
point, a refusal to aid in such a seemingly
costless manner would have been
unthinkable. Crerar was also determined to
maximize Canada's army effort and place it
on a more efficient basis to fulfil Canada's
responsibilities, as he perceived them. In the
long term he was determined to use the
window of opportunity provided by the war to
broaden the prerogatives of the Government's
military advisors, to enhance their influence
in the defence policy making process. He
believed that the military profession's future
prestige and position were intimately linked
to an effective and visible army effort during

the war. The request for a high profile, and,
according to strategic assessments, low-risk
Canadian army contribution fit the bill.
Crerar should be faulted for his failure
to make the potential risks inherent in
garrisoning Hong Kong absolutely clear to the
government. This was his responsibility.
However, Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes
observation that the failure to call for
intelligence assessments in the fall of 1941
would have led to a court-martial in II
Canadian Corps does not account for Canada's
non-existent intelligence capabilities and
Crerar's professional knowledge. 60 Neither
does it capture the urgency felt by all
participants lest the chance to deter the
Japanese and avoid a Pacific war fade. Indeed,
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subsequent revelations indicate that the
British were correct in their assessment of
the importance of maintaining Chinese morale
at this critical juncture, and thus tying down
the bulk of the Japanese army, even if their
intelligence miscalculated the magnitude of
Japanese irrationality. The Americans made
the same mistake. Crerar followed suit. 61
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